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Case No. 7680 
In the Sttpreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GREAT A~fERICAX INDE~fNITY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
W. S. BERRYESSA and FRANK BERRYESSA, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
This is an action brought by plaintiff (appellant) 
against the defendant W. S. Berryessa, (the defendant 
Frank Berryessa could not be served with summons by 
reason of his absence from the State of Utah), upon a 
joint and several promissory note executed by defend-
ants. Defendant W. S. Berryessa admitted the exe-
cution of the note, admitted default in the monthly pay-
ment, admitted his refusal to pay, and demanded a can-
cellation of the note as to him, based upon the alleged 
ground of duress and want of consideration. By way of 
counterclaim, defendant also prayed for judgment 
against plaintiff for the return of $1550.00 paid by de-
fendant to plaintiff and also for the return of an un-
cashed check in the sum of $500.00, based upon the same 
grounds. Trial to a jury resulted in a verdict in favor 
of defendant, cancelling the note, and also for a return 
of the $1500.00 and the uncashed check. 
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Much of the evidence is without conflict. However 
there was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to what 
occurred at a meeting which was alleged to have occurred 
in the office of J. G. Hagman on June 6, 1950. We shall 
very briefly summarize the evidence. 
Defendant W. S. Berryessa is the father of the 
defendant Frank Berryessa. Frank Berryessa was an 
employee of the Eccles Hotel Company, which operates 
the Hotel Ben Lomond at Ogden, Weber County, Utah. 
Plaintiff isst1ed a surety bond guaranteeing the honesty 
and integrity of said employee. 
About the forepart of January, 1950, the hotel dis-
covered a shortage in the cash entrusted to Frank 
Berryessa. When confronted with the accusation, hr 
admitted the same, but the amount was then undeter-
mined. The father was informed of the shortage. He 
immediately came to the office of the hotel, accompanied 
by Frank, and had a talk with Irvine F. Keller, the 
company auditor. The defendant stated that he was 
prepared to make good any and all losses and was very 
insistent on keeping the matter quiet and not reporting 
it to the bonding company. At that .time it was more 
or less assumed that the shortage involved only the 
so-called ''cash account,'' and the shortage was thought 
to be in the neighborhood of $2000.00. Defendant in-
sisted on signing a note to the hotel company for the 
amount of the assumed shortage, aggregating $2000.00. 
Later the hotel discovered discrepancies and apparent 
shortages in what is referred to as the "ledger account" 
and then it became evident that the shortage would be 
greater than at first anticipated. However, defendant 
insisted that whatever the amount he was prepared to 
C) 
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make it g-ood. \Yhen the auditor~ began lllYL't'tigating 
the ledg·er aecounts, Frank, of course, knew of the 
shortage and also kne\Y it would be discovered. l-Ie 
thereupon wrote a list of the ledg-er accounts on a small 
piece of paper, which aggregated some $4000.00 or there-
abouts, and handed the ~arne to his wife and then ap-
parently fled the state. His wife then handed this list 
to the defendant, suggesting, however, that the same 
be not given to the hotel but that they wait develop-
ments and see if the hotel was successful in finding the 
same. However, the defendant, in a subsequent inter-
vie''?, handed the list to 1\'Ir. Keller, and defendant again 
insisted tha! he was prepared to take care of the short-
age. He explained that he had fortunately just sold 
some property to Safe,,.ray, from which he was realizing 
a substantial profit, and that he would have funds avail-
able to make good the shortage. 
When it had been established that the shortage 
would aggregate around $6500.00, Campbell Eccles, 
:Manager of the hotel, called defendant and told him that 
in view of the amount involved he felt duty-bound to 
notify the bonding company, and the defendant concur-
red in his conclusion. Eccles thereupon notified the 
plaintiff's agent of the shortage. Plaintiff referred 
the rna tter to J. G. Hagman, :Manager of the Insurance 
Adjustment Company, to adjust the loss. Mr. Hagman 
came to Ogden and met defendant at the hotel. At that 
time 1Ir. Hagman suggested to defendant that he ought 
to bring Frank back and he stated that he would do so. 
There was some general talk a~out the financial respon-
sibility of the members of the family, including a son-
in-law who had a ranch in New :Mexico. Defendant did 
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have Frank return to Ogden, and Hagman and the de-
fendants and !1:r. Keller met at the hotel. A general 
conversation ensued concerning the accounts and the 
shortages and the circumstances leading up to the same. 
At a subsequent meeting between the same parties 
and after the auditor had made a full and complete 
audit, Frank si2;ned the same, (Defendant's Exhibit 1), 
in which he admitted the accuracy of the auditor's 
report. After that Frank and defendant went down to 
Salt Lake to Hagman's office, and some general dis-
cussions were had with respect to Frank's ability to 
make good the loss. Frank insisted that he had turned 
some $2000.00 of the shortage to his brother-in-law, Roy 
Patterson, and Hagman suggested that if such was the 
case, then the brother-in-law should be willing to sign 
a note with defendant and Frank, and as a result of the 
discussion Hagman prepared a note for $4678.40 (the 
same being the difference between the admitted short-
age and the note previously signed by Frank and the 
defendant and delivered to the hotel.) The ·note was 
made payable to the plaintiff and provided for payments 
at the rate of $250.00 quarterly, commencing June I, 
1950. It was assumed and apparently tacitly agreed and 
understood that the note to be signed by Frank, Roy 
Patterson, and the defendant. Frank took the unsigned 
note and he and ~is father then left Hagman's office. 
Later on defendant and, Frank returned to Hagman's 
office with the note unsigned. Frank stated that the 
brother-in-law either would not sign the note or they 
had not been able to contact him. Up to this point 
there is no contention on the part of defendant that 
anything improper had occurred and no contention made 
4 
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of any dure8s prior to this meeting. (Tr. 56) The testi-
mony all reflects a situation where the defendant ap-
peared to be most anxious to be of financial assistance 
to Frank, and in Yie,\· of his previous declarations that 
he was prepared to assi8t him in making good the loss, 
it seemed to be at least tacitly understood and accepted 
as a fact that the defendant intended to sign a note 
with Frank for the amount of the shortage, and the 
suggestion apparently had come from defendant, right 
from the first meeting, that he intended to and wanted 
to do so. 
We make this explanation at this point in order to 
lay the foundation for what the defendant claims took 
place at a meeting which he said occurred in Hagman's 
office on June 6, 1950, but \Vhich did not occur on that 
date, and the signing of the note did not occur at that 
time or place, as first testified by defendant. 
Concerning this matter we quote in full the direct 
testimony of the defendant commencing on page 20 to 
the end of page 22 : 
'' Q Now, you started to tell us about a later meet-
ing that you had. 
A Later we took that note, Frank and I took 
the note back to l\fr. Hagman and told him 
Roy wouldn't sign the note, or hadn't signed 
it. 
Q Now, just one meeting, can we fix the ap-
proximate time of the meeting you are now 
speaking of1 
A I think this second meeting was June s1x, 
as I remember. 
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.Q So you are now down to a meeting that you 
had with Mr. Hagman on June 6, 1950. 
A Yes. 
Q Which is the date that the note in question 
bears. 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Now, who was present at that 
meeting and where was it held~ 
A Held in Mr. Hagman's office in the Conti-
nental Building in Salt Lake City. 
Q And who was present¥ 
A Mr. Hagman, Frank, and I. 
Q All right. Now, will you state in substance 
and effect what transpired at that meeting? 
You have spoken of taking the unsigned note 
back. 
A Well, as I remember 1\fr. Hagman wanted 
me to sign that note, and I refused to sign 
that note because I couldn't pay that amount, 
and I knew Frank couldn't pay that amount. 
Q Now, what amount are you speaking of~ 
A $250.00 a quarter. 
Q And that was a note made out for the full 
$6800.00. 
A As I remember, yes. We argued back and 
forth about this note; Mr. Hagman got angry 
and swore and pounded the desk with his fist, 
and said, 'You can't come here and tell me 
what you will do. ' I said, 'I can't sign that 
note because I can't pay it.' We talked for 
a while. He said, 'what can you pay,' and 
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I said, 'I don't think \W' enn pn~' more than 
$50.00 n month,' and he said, 'at $f10.00 :1 
month, yon 'II never !.':et this pairl.' Then lw 
agreed to make the note out, and I ·war-;; to nn v 
him $2,000.00 ensh and sig11 the note "'''ith 
Frank, making the note payable at $50.00 a 
month. We signed that note, and I rome 
back to Ogden and took a mortgage on my 
home. 
Q Now, let's stop right there a minute. Was 
this note for $4865.20 prepared on the occas-
ion of this .June 6th meeting in l\fr. Hage-
man's office? 
A Yes. l\[r. Hagman had his secretary make 
that note out while we were there. 
Q And was it signed at that time' 
A It was signed at that time. 
Q And was it left with l\Ir. Hagman? 
A Yes. It was left with Mr. Hagman. 
Q And is that the note which has been intro-
duced in evidence as plaintiff's exhibit A' 
A Yes, as far as I know that is the exact note. 
Q Now, you have spoken of a statement made 
by :\Ir. Hagman as to what would happen if 
you didn't do as you were told. Was any-
thing said as to what would happen if you 
did do what you were told? 
A Mr. Hagman told me if we would sign the 
note and I would make that payment that he 
wouldn't prosecute Frank, but if I didn't he 
would have to prosecute him. 
Q Now, following the signing of that note and 
your agreement to pay two thousand dollars 
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as you have testified to, you returned to 
Ogden with Frank. 
A Yes. 
Q Anri what did you do in connection with the 
two thousand dollars~ 
A Well, I went to the loan companies and 
borrowed money to pay two thousand dollars. 
I owed on my improvements on the place, 
and I only had $1500.00 left to pay Mr. Hag-
man. I got a cashiers check dated July 3, 
and it was made out to me, but I signed it 
over to the adjustment company. 
Q Well, now, when did you see Mr. Hagman 
again after this June 6th meeting? 
A I think the Fourth of July. I wouldn't be 
sure. I got the check out on the third of 
July. I think it was the Fourth, and Mr. 
Hagman came down to my home, and I gave 
him that cashiers check for $1500.00 and my 
personal check for $500.00, and I asked him 
if he would hold that personal check until 
I could take out a further loan and meet it, 
and he said that he would. 
Q As you recall that, that was about July four. 
A Yes. I think it was. It was soon after I got 
that check. I think it was July four because 
I was around home working when Mr. Hag-
man drove up. 
Q And at that time you endorsed over to him 
this cashier's check for $1500.00 and gave him 
your personal check for $500.00. 
A Yes. 
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Q Which made up t1w two thousand dollars 
which yon agreed to pay. 
A Yes." 
The defendant also testified that he personally paid 
$50.00 on the note for the July payment, but that the 
other $200.00 which ·was paid on the note was paid by 
Frank or his "ife. 
The defendant was then asked the following ques-
tion (Tr. 26): 
"Q Now, :Mr. Berryessa, I come back to this June 
6 meeting with :Mr. Hagman and the occasion 
for your having signed the $4800.00 note 
exhibit A and ask you if you would have 
signed that note bad it not been for the state-
ments made by Mr. Hagman on that occas-
ion~" 
Over plaintiff's objection, the Court permitted the de-
fendant to make the following answer: 
''A No. I would not have signed that check be-
cause I knew, that note because I knew I 
couldn't meet it because I have my aged 
mother to take care of and my wife, and I 
have other obligations I have to pay. I knew 
I couldn't pay that much money and keep my 
payments paid up.'' 
The defendant was then asked: 
"Q Now, I'll ask you if you would have signed 
that note at that time had it not been for the 
statements Mr. Hagman, as testified to by 
you, that if you did sign Frank would not he 
criminally prosecuted.'' 
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Over the objection of the plaintiff the Court permitted 
the defendant to make the following answer: 
"A No I would not have sig-ned that. That i~ 
the only reason I signed it is to keep Frank 
from g~ing to the penitentiary.'' 
The defendant was then asked this question at page 27: 
"Q Now, coming to .July three or four, the date 
on which von turned over to Mr. HRQTil:ln 
the endor~ed cashiers check for $1500.00, 
would you have paid that amount of money 
to him on that date had it not been for the 
previous statements made by Mr. Hagman 
on June 6?'' 
Over plaintiff's objection the Court permitted the wit-
ness to answer, ''No.'' 
The witness was then asked the question: 
'' Q Or would you have given him the $500.00 
personal check, had it not been for thm;e 
statements made on June 6?'' 
Again, over the objection of the plaintiff, the Court 
permitted the defendant to make the following answer: 
"A No. I gave him that check to make up the two 
thousand dollars that I had promised him 
that other meeting to pay. I tried my best 
to pay it, but I just couldn't make it." 
Notwithstanding the defendant's positive and un-
equivocal statement that the note in question was signed 
by defendant at Hagman's office on June 6th, the de-
fendant, when confronted with positive evidence to the 
contrary, reluctantly admitted that this statement was 
untrue, and he admitted that he did not go to Salt Lake 
10 
j 
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City on J nne 6th a~ testified to b~' him, but that he, 
his wife, and Frank went down to Hagman's office on 
Sunday, June 4th; that a~ a result of that visit I-Iagman 
prepared the note in question on the following day, 
June 5th, and forwarded the same by letter to the de-
fendant addressed nt Ogden, Ftah, and that the de-
fendant signed the note in Ogden on about J nne 6th 
and mailed the signed note ·with the original letter back 
to ~Ir. Hagman in Salt Lake City about June 6th or a 
day or two thereafter. (See Tr. 41 to 47) 
The foregoing eYiclence. as testified to by defendant 
on direct examination and as modified by his admissions 
on cross-examination, cons'i:itutes all of the evidence in 
this case upon which the defendant bases his claim that 
the note was signed under duress and ,,,ithout consider-
ation. There was also introduced in evidence, as a part 
of defendant's cross-examination, plaintiff's Exhibits 
C, D, E, F, and G. These exhibits were letters written 
hy the defendant to the plaintiff on the respective dates 
which they bear, all of them being subsequent in time to 
the meeting of June 4th. They show on their face the 
voluntary acts and conduct of the defendant. Plaintiff 
then had marked for identification Exhibit H. However 
the letter "~'as not offered in evidence because it was not 
written by the defendant and in order to keep the record 
straight the plaintiff then offered in evidence, as Plain-
tiff's Exhibit I, a letter written by defendant, which 
was objected to by defendant and his objection sus-
tained. At this point it should be noted that Mr. Hag-
man positively and emphatically denied that he made 
the statements attributed to him by the defendant at 
the meeting in his office on June 4th. 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. The Court improperly permitted defend-
ant to answer the following question: 
"Q Now, Mr. Berryessa, I come back to this June 
6th meeting with Mr. Hagman and the occas-
ion for you having signed the $4800 note, 
Exhibit A, and ask you if you would have 
signed the note had it not been for the state-
ments made by Mr. Hagman on that occas-
ion?" (Tr. 26) 
and similar questions propounded to the defendant. 
(Tr. 26 and 27) 
POINT 2. The Court improperly refused to allow 
appellant to introduce Exhibit I, the same being a letter 
written by defendant to plaintiff, (Tr. 51), which said 
offer was renewed in the absence of the jury. (Tr. 55) 
POINT 3. The evidence of the defendant was in-
sufficient to justify the submission to the jury of the 
issues of duress or want of consideration, and plaintiff's 
motion for a directed verdict as to the note sued on 
should have been g-ranted. (Tr. 58) Renewed at con-
clusion of trial. (Tr. 124) 
POINT 4. The evidence was insufficient to justify 
the submission to the jury of the issue of defendant's 
right to recover the $1550 and check for $500 set forth 
in defendant's counterclaim, and plaintiff's motion for 
dismissal of defendant's counterclaim should have been 
granted. (Tr. 58) Renewed at conclusion of trial. (Tr. 
124) 
12 
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POIX'r 5. The Court erred in the giving of certain 
instn1etions, the giving of which were excepted to by 
appellant. (Tr. 13-!) 
POINT 6. The Court erred in its refusal to give to 
the jury certain instructions as requested by appellant, 
to which exceptions were taken. ( Tr. 133) 
POIX'r 7. The appellant's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding· the verdict and for a new trial should 
haYe been granted. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. Over plaintiff's objection, the Court per-
mitted the defendant to answer the question as to 
whether he, defendant, would have signed the note had 
it not been for the statement made by Mr. Hagman on 
that occasion and similar questions propounded to de-
fendant, all of which appear in the transcript at pages 
26 and 27. It is plaintiff's position that the Court 
should have sustained plaintiff's objection to this ques-
tion for the following reasons: 
A. It called for a conclusion of the witness on the 
ultimate fact which the jury was to determine. 
B. The answer to whether the defendant would or 
would not have signed the note had it not been for the 
alleged statements is no proof of duress. 
As we conceive and understand the law of duress, 
it involves much more than the mere question as to 
whether the defendant would or would not have signed 
the note in question had it not been for the statements 
claimed to have been made by Hagman. The question 
was whether or not the alleged duress brought about a 
13 
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mental condition whereby the defendant's will was en-
tirely overcome by reason of the alleged threats, so that 
his act in signing was not the act of the defendant but 
was in effect the act of the alleged perpetrator of the 
duress. We shall discuss this matter further when we 
discuss the law applicable to duress. 
Point 2. We think that the Court clearly erred in 
refusing to admit plaintiff's Exhibit I in evidence. It 
certainly had some bearing on the question of the state 
of mind of the defendant when the letter was written 
and was certainly competent evidence going to his state 
of mind. We also think the Court erred when the offer 
was again renewed at the close of the defendant's testi-
mony and in the absence of the jury. (See Tr. 55) It 
seems to us that where the question involves the state 
of mind of the defendant when he signed the note and 
also when he made the subsequent payments, any evi-
dance, if not too remote in time and certainly it cannot 
be claimed that this was too remote, which might have 
a bearing upon the state of mind of the signer, is com-
petent and should have been received. ~ 
Point 3. At the conclusion of the defendant's evi- j 
dence, plaintiff moved the Court for a directed verdict 
as to the legality of the note in question, which motion 
was overruled and denied. At this point it is admitted 
that there may have been some question as to whether 
or not the acceleration provisions of the note permitted 
the plaintiff to recover the full amount of the note and 
' on this point the Court concluded that all that was 
necessary was to have the jury determine whether or 
not the note was a valid note and leave the legal question 
of whether the plaintiff could accelerate the note to he 
14 
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decided as a question of law. No complaint is made by 
plaintiff as to this ruling of the Court and when plaintiff 
renewed its motion for a directed verdict at the con-
clusion of the trial the motion was so modified as to 
embrace this point. The question, therefore, presented 
by the plaintiff is whether or not there was sufficient 
evidence of duress or want of consideration to submit 
that issue to the jury, and it makes no difference so far 
as plaintiff is concerned whether it can accelerate the 
note or not. The only question is whether the note is a 
Yalid obligation. 
The reason for the bringing of the action is this : 
In December of 1950, defendant brought suit against 
the Insurance Adjustment Company to have the note 
declared invalid. However, defendant did not sue the 
owner of the note, Great American Indemnity Company, 
and that suit was dismissed. The plaintiff, therefore, 
concluded to bring this suit when the December pay-
ment was not made. 
Let us analyze the testimony of the defendant in 
the light of admitted surrounding circumstances for the 
purpose of determining whether or not there is any 
evidence upon which the issue of duress could be sub~ 
mitted to the jury. 
According to the defendant's own version, at the 
time the first note was prepared it provided for a pay-
ment of $250.00 each quarter. According to defend-
ant's version of what occurred on June 4th, he said 
that l\Ir. Hagman wanted him to sign that note, which 
he refused to sign because he couldn't pay that amount, 
that is, he couldn't pay the $250.00 per quarter. Defend-
15 
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ant's objection to signing the note as originally prepared 
was based solely on the ground that the payment of 
$250.00 each quarter was more than he and Frank could 
pay. Of course defendant now tries to make it appear 
that he was the one who would have to pay the note, 
notwithstanding the fact that the party primarily liable 
was his son Frank, and the discussion as to the amount 
which could be paid centered around Frank's ability 
rather than the defendant's ability to pay off the obH-
~;ation, and the defendant says that at this meeting "We 
argued back and forth about this note and Hagman got 
angry and swore and pounded the desk with his fist 
and said 'You can't come here and tell me what you will 
do,' " to which defendant replied, "I can't sign that 
note (the original note) because I can't pay it." He 
testified, "Hagman said 'What can you pay~' and I 
said 'I don't think we can pay more than $50.00 a month,' 
and he said 'At $50.00 a month you'll never get this 
paid.' '' 
However, it is interesting to note that Hagman then 
agreed to prepare a new note providing for a payment 
of $50.00 per month instead of $250.00 per quarter. In 
other words, even under defendant's own testimony he 
was the one who suggested that the original note cal-
ling for $250.00 a quarter was more than he and Frank 
could pay, but he thought that they could pay $50.00 
a month, and upon making this suggestion, according to 
his reluctant admissions on cross-examination, they left 
the office, it being a Sunday, and Hagman advised them 
he would have such a note prepared and mail it to them 
in Ogden. The note was received by defendant, pre-
pared strictly in accordance with his own suggestions, 
16 
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and was not signed until two days after the alleged 
meeting and after he had ample time to seek advice 
and to recover the full possession of his faculties, even 
assuming any loss of his reasoning faculty by the claimed 
threats. It was of course very e.asy for him to take 
the witness stand after he attempted to rescind the 
contract and say ·that he would not have signed the 
note had it not been for the alleged threats, but' we sub-
mit that his whole course of dealings indicates that 
this conclusion, arrived at many months after the trans-
action, is contrary to all of the facts in this case. Even 
though Mr. Hagman said, as contended by defendant, 
that "You can't come here and tell me what you ·will 
do,'' and even though !Ir. Hagman told him that if he 
would sign the note they wouldn't prosecute Frank but 
if he didn't they would have to prosecute him, yet we 
contend that this evidence, when considered in the light 
of all the admitted facts and circumstances in con-
neetion with the case, falls far short of provin~ duress 
as that term has been defined, not only by this Court, 
but by many other courts. We rely principally upon the 
case of 
and 
Ellison vs. Pingree, 
64 Utah 479, 
231 Pac. 827, 
Fox vs. Piercey, 
________________ Utah ________________ , 
227 P. 2d 763. 
In the Pingree case, this Court quotes with approval 
13 C. J., Page 396, 
Section 310, 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in which the Court says: 
"Duress is that degree of constraint or dan~er, 
either actually inflicted or threatened and Im-
pending, which is sufficient in severity or ap-
prehension to overcome the mind of a person of 
ordinary firmness.'' 
Again this Court quotes with approval 
1 Page on Contracts, 
Section 496 : 
''A person in his right mind and in full control 
of his faculties, who understands what he is 
doing and who has full power to enter into a 
legal transaction or to refuse to do so, does not 
act under duress if he enters into such trans-
action.'' 
And in the Pingree case the Court sustained the lower 
Court in its finding that there was no evidence of 
duress. 
We have already alluded to the question raised 
under Point 1, and here again we desire to revert to this 
proposition. 
We contend that there is no evidence that when the 
defendant signed this note on July 6th, two days after 
the meeting in Salt Lake City, that he was not in full 
control of his faculties. We contend that he understood 
perfectly what he was doing and he had the mental 
capacity to either enter into or refuse to execute the 
note ; that he had at least two days' time to reflect and 
to seek advice. It seems to us that with no showing 
whatsoever that he ·was in any state of mental confusion 
that for him to be permitted to merely say 'I would not 
}).ave signed this note had it not been for the state-
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ments made,'' when considered in the light of all of the 
undisputed fact~ and circumstances surrounding the 
transaction, amounts to no evidence whatsoever of duress 
or compulsion. \V P reserve for further discussion under 
Point -!the question of a delay in acting after the alleged 
duress has been imposed. 
In 
17 C.J.S., Page 531, 
Section 172, 
the author says: 
• • _.Mere threats of criminal prosecution are not 
enough. There must be a reasonable ground for 
apprehension that the threat will be carried into 
execution and it must also appear that the 
threats operated on the mind on the party so as 
to overcome his will.'' 
The following cases cite the general rule of law 
governing duress: 
Pugh-Miller Drilling Company 
vs. ::\Iain Oil Company, 
276 Pac. 1043. 
Winget vs. Rockwood, 
69 F. 2d 323 
White vs. Scan·itt, 
111 s.w. 2d 18 
Sulzner vs. Cappsan-Lumley 
Company, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 421 
It is also well-established that a person may waive 
the defense of duress by subsequent conduct. See 
Dairy Company Operative Association 
vs. Brands Creamery, 30 P. 2d 338 
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17 C.J.S., Page 529, Section 
169, and cases cited. 
CONSIDEHATION 
That there was a valid consideration for the sign-
ing of the note cannot be questioned. See 
Spear vs. Ryan, 
208 Pac. 1069. 
Certainly when the payee of the note accepted the joint 
signatures of the defendant and his son, and thereby ex-
tended to the son additional time in which to make pay-
ment of the obligation which he admitedly owed, this 
of itself constitutes sufficient consideration for the 
signing of the note by the defendant. 
We will discuss this more in detail under Point 5 
relating to instructions. 
Point 4. Plaintiff moved for a dismissal of de-
fendant's counterclaim wherein he sought to recover 
the $1,550.00 which he had already paid and the return 
of his uncashed personal check for $500.00. The trial 
court overruled and denied this motion and also denied 
a similar motion made at the conclusion of the taking 
of evidence and overruled and denied plaintiff's re- ~ 
quested instruction number two, all of which raised the 
same point, that is, whether or not there was any evi-
dence to submit to the jury as to defendant's right to 
recover on the counterclaim. We contend that even 
assuming there was sufficient evidence to go to the 
jury as to the question of duress and failure of con-
sideration in procuring defendant's signature to the 
note, yet the recovery back of money subsequently paid 
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he freely and voluntarily endorsed the cashier's check 
stands on an entirely different approach and that our 
motions to dismiss the counterclaim should have been 
granted. It must be remembered that defendant makes 
no claim of any alleged duress imposed subsequent to 
the meeting· of June 4th. Yet on July 4th, a month later, 
for $1,500.00 and delivered the same to Hagman and 
then wrote his personal check for $500.00, but requested 
Hagman to hold the same for a short time .. Then at a 
later date be freely and voluntarily paid the $50.00 
installment on the note representing the July payment. 
It must also be remembered that he never at any time 
made any protest of any kind or character whatsoever 
with respect to the making of these payments, nor did 
he in any manner protest or attempt to repudiate the 
transaction until the following December and during 
this interim he wrote several letters to Hagman. See 
·Exhibits C, D, E and F. In none of such letters did 
he suggest any duress or improper conduct. But on 
the contrary his letters were friendly and courteous and 
indicated a friendly and courteous relationship. We 
contend that this evidence conclusively established the 
fact that the transaction of July 4th and the subsequent 
payment of the $50.00 constituted what amounts in law 
to a voluntary payment which cannot be recovered 
back. In this connection we desire first of all to call 
to the court's attention the following language set forth 
in the case of 
Fox vs. Piercey, 
Cited supra. 
''In view of the fact that this case is deter-
mined upon the considerations discussed above, 
it is unnecessary to resolve the problem sug-
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gested by appellant regarding the lapse of time 
between the alleged threats and the presentation 
of Fox's resignation. We do not disagree with 
the contention that, even if duress had been prac-
ticed, an act done after sufficient time had elap-
sed for fear to disappear would not be voidable 
for duress. (Italics added.) 
This matter is discussed in 
48 C.J., commencing at page 734, 
Section 280 to Section 311, inclusive. 
We quote from the text the following found on Page 
7 49, Section 300 : 
''Where no warrant has been issued or pro-
ceedings begun, and there is no immediate danger, 
a payment with full knowledge of the facts will 
not, as a general rule, be deemed compulsory 
so as to entitle the payor to recover it back, by 
reason of the fact that the payment is made under 
a mere apprehension or threat of a criminal 
prosecution. However, demands and threats of 
persons clothed with governmental authority to 
carry them into execution by arrest and prose-
cution stand on a different footing from demands 
and threats of private individuals, and money 
paid because thereof, if unwarranted, may gen-
erally be recovered back, as in such cases the 
parties do not stand on equal footing. 
Cases in support of the foregoing text are cited in the 
notes. 
The subject is also discussed in 
and in 
70 C.J.S., commencing on Page 
350, Section 146 
to 149, inclusive. 
22 
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48 C.J., commencing at 
Pag-e 7~14, Section 280. 
The defendant admits that he is a man of more 
than average intelligence. He has been a school teacher 
for many years. Several members of this family with 
whom he was in constant touch had attained eminence 
in the field of education. It seems incredible that a man 
of that training· and experience could wait a month and 
then be permitted to say that when he made this pay-
ment he was acting under duress claimed to have been 
invoked a month previous. There is no evidence in 
this case that the defendant was ever acting under fear 
or that his mind was in the slightest degree coerced by 
anything that was said or done on June 4th, even ac-
cording the defendant every reasonable inperence as 
contained in his own testimony. Defendant himself 
realized the weakness of his case and so he c-laimed on 
direct examination that he signed the note in Hag-
man's office when the threat was made. He also claimed 
that the first note which provided for a payment of 
$250.00 a quarter provided for the entire amount of the 
shortage and from that tried to infer that the demand 
for the $2,000.00 was induced under threats of duress. 
He was forced to admit that both of these statements 
were and are absolutely untrue. It is a case which 
comes very close to perjury because when confronted 
with documentary evidence he had to admit that his 
story was absolutely untrue. The original note of April 
19th for $250.00 quarterly was produced. It provided 
for payment of $4,678.40. The fact that the note as 
finally signed was not signed in the office at all has 
already been alluded to. We say, therefore, that there 
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was no competent evidence to submit to a jury that on 
July 4th, when the defendant paid the $1500.00 and 
gave his check for $500.00, the payment was induced by 
any duress then and there existing which overcame the 
mind of the defendant. 
Point 5. ·_rhe Court in its instructions to the jury 
in Instruction No. 1 stated : 
"The second defense is that even if it should be 
determined that such duress has not been proven, 
nevertheless the only consideration for his sign-
ing the note was the promise of plaintiff's agent, 
J. G. Hagman, Jr., that if he would sign, Frank 
Berryessa would not be criminally prosecuted, 
and that such consideration is illegal and insuf-
ficient to support the note. You are instructed 
that either of these defenses, if established by a 
proponderance of the evidence, is a sufficient 
and adequate defense to plaintiff's action against 
the defendant W. S. Berryessa.'' 
Plaintiff duly excepted to the foregoing instruction. 
In Instruction No. 6 the Court instructed the jury 
as follows: 
''You are instructed that the note sued upon by 
the plaintiff is invalid against the defendant W. 
S. Berryessa if not supported by a valuable con-
sideration. A promissory note given for the sup-
pression of a criminal prosecution is against pub-
lic policy and cannot be enforced between the 
parties and it is immaterial whether the indi-
vidual as to whom the criminal prosecution is 
suppressed was guilty or innocent. Accordingly, 
if you find from a proponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant W. S. Berryessa signed the 
note sued upon by the plaintiff in consideration 
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of plaintiff's promise, through itt' agent .J. G. 
Hagman, .Jr., that Frank Berryessa would, not 
be criminally prosecuted for his defalcation, the 
note is invalid as to the defendant W. S. Berry-
essa and you must so find.'' 
Plaintiff likewise excepted to this instruction. 
Our objection to that portion of Instruction No. 1 
quoted supra is this: It gives the jury the iden that 
there are two separate and distjnct defenses to the 
validity of the transaction : One. duress, and the other, 
failnre nf consideration, and the Court specificallv tells 
the jury that if either of thPse defenses i~ established 
by a preponderHnce of the evidence, the plaintiff cannot 
recover. Tn other words, the Court. by this instruetion 
anrl that portion of Im:;truction No. 6. g-ives to the i1nv 
the idea that even thoug-h duress i~ not proven, yet the 
jury may still brinq: in a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant for want of consideration. As we have heretofore 
pointed ont, there can be no question but what there was 
a consideration sufficient to support defendant's sig-n-
in~ of the promissory note. A joint payee or endorser 
of a promissory note cannot defeat the action even 
though he personally receives no benefit from the 
transaction. This, of course, is fundamental. The con-
sideration in this case which would support the note is 
the acceptance by plaintiff of a promissory note wherein 
and whereby Frank Berryessa is given an extension of 
time in which to pay an obligation which he admits to 
be presently due. The only question, therefore, in this 
case, as we see it, is whether or not the obtaining of 
the defendant's signature to the note was obtained by 
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duress or coercion, as that term is legally defined. If 
there was duress, then the note is invalid because of the 
duress, which some courts refer to as a failure of con-
sideration. 
In the case of 
Brane vs. First National Bank, 
20 P. 2d 506, 
the Court says : 
''Both parties recognize the fact that the question 
of want of consideration is incident to and logic-
ally a part of the question of duress, so that the 
duress feature is the sole and only question 
here involved.'' 
We contend that the Court, by g:tVIng of that 
portion of Instruction No. 1 and Instruction No. 6, neces-
sarily confused the jury into thinking that even though 
defendant failed to prove duress by a preponderance 
of the evidence, yet plaintiff cannot recover because 
there was a failure of consideration. In this we think 
the Court committed prejudicial error. 
Point 6. Plaintiff requested the Court to give its 
Requested Instructions No. 1 and No. 2. This question 
has already been discussed under Points 3 and 4. 
Plaintiff requested the Court to give its Requested 
Instruction No. 3. The Court, in its Instruction No. 4, 
adopted a portion of this requested instruction but it is 
to be noted that the Court left out of its Instruction No. 
4 the following which is contained in plaintiff's Re-
quested Instruction No. 3: 
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''Duress will not ordinarily invalidate a promis-
sory note entered into after opportunity for de-
liberate action.'' 
We think the Conl"t should haYe included in its defi-
nition the foregoing phrase because the evidence showed 
conclusiYel~~ that the note in question was not signed at 
the time of the alleged duress but two or three days later 
and the payment of the $1550.00 was made over a month 
later. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 4 was refused. 
We think the plaintiff "\vas entitled to have thjs instruct-
ion given to the jury. It is certainly a correct state-
ment of the law, as pronounced by this Court in the 
Ellison case, and we do not believe that the giving of 
Instruction K o. 6 embraces this legal concept. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 was par-
tially covered by the Court's Instn1etion No. 5, but the 
Court refused to include therein the following: 
''It is the law that payments voluntarily made 
cannot be recovered back, even though the orig-
inal transaction was entered into under duress. 
To entitle the defendant to recover any payments 
made hr him to the plaintiff, it is encumbant 
upon the defendant to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the duress which in-
duced the defendant to sign said note, if you 
find as a fact that such duress actually existed, 
continued in the mind of the defendant at the 
time the defendant made said payments, and 
that such duress controlled the mind of the de-
dendant to the extent that said payments or 
either of them was made under and by reason 
of said duress and \\~as therefore not a voluntary 
payment.'' 
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The Court in its entire instructions failed to define 
the term "voluntary payment," although it was ex-
pressly made an issue in this case, and we think it was 
prejudicial error not to do so. Certainly the plain-
tiff was entitled to have its theory presented to the jury. 
In plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 7 was a 
request embodied upon the theory of a waiver of the 
defense of duress. It is well-established that duress 
may he waived and the contract ratified by the injured 
party after the duress bas been removed. 
17 C. J. S., Page 529, 
Section 169 
70 C. J. S., Page 134 
White vs. Scarritt, 
111 s. w. 2d 18 
The evidence in this case showed that a month after 
the alleged duress the defendant paid the $1500.00, in 
accordance with his agreement; that thereafter he paid 
another $50.00; that between June 4, 1950 and Decem-
ber 1, 1950 the defendant repeatdly acknowledged the 
obligation by letters as well as in friendly conversa-
tions with l\1r. Hagman. (Tr. 93, 97, 98) 
Counsel for respondent may claim that the issue 
of a waiver ,~.·as not pleaded. We take the position that 
under the new rules no ·waiver need be pleaded oocause 
there is no provision in the new rules for the filing of 
a reply. Under the old practice matters of confession 
and avoidance had to be set forth in a reply, but now 
no reply is provided for and surely one does not have 
to plead anticipatory defenses as a part of the complaint. 
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Second, we think the questions of wai \'er is raised 
by the pleadiiig. Defendant ~a~,~ the plaintiff was 
guilty of duress. Plaintiff denies there was duress. 
An~, fact which showed there was no duress is admis-
sible under the general issue. 
Third, plaintiff did file a reply to the counter-
elaim of the defendant, wherein defendant sought to 
recover the $1550.00 paid, and as to this issue the plead-
ing was sufficient to raise the question of a waiver. 
To each and all of the foregoing instructions and 
requests the plaintiff duly expected. ( Tr. 133 to 135) 
Point 7. It is plaintiff's contention that by rea-
son of the manifest errors committed by the Trial Court 
the Court should have granted plaintiff's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the ,-enlict as to both the 
validity of the promissory note and the dismissal of the 
defendant's counterclaim, but in any event plaintiff 
contends that the motion for judgment should have 
been granted as to the defendant's counterclaim. 
Respectfully submitted 
LeRoy B. Young of 
THATCHER & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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